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The prominent place given to the principle of subsidiarity in the Maastricht 
Treaty reveals widespread concerns about the accumulation of regulatory powers 
in Brussels, but also raises several theoretically interesting questions. First, how 
is over-regulation at the European level possible, given that national 
governments are strongly represented at every stage of the policy-making 
process? Again, Member States strive to preserve the greatest possible degree 
of sovereignty and policy-making autonomy, as shown for example by their 
stubborn resistance to Community intervention in areas such as macroeconomic 
policy and indirect taxation. Why, then, have they accepted many regulatory 
measures not foreseen by the founding treaty and not strictly necessary for the 
proper functioning of the common market? Finally, concerning the quality rather 
than the quantity of Community regulations: how is innovation at all possible 
in a system where the formal rights of initiative of the Commission, as well as 
its executive functions, seem to be so tightly controlled?
There can be little doubt about the determination of the Member States 
to limit the Commission’s discretion at every stage of policy making. Political
Following the terminology of the Maastricht Treaty, I use the expression European 
Community (EC) to denote the economic and social "pillar" of the European Union. 
This paper does not deal with the other two pillars — the common foreign and security 
policy, and cooperation in the fields of justice and home affairs. "European Union" 




























































































initiative comes from the heads of state or government (European Council); 
political mediation takes place in the framework of the Committee of Permanent 
Representatives of the Member States (COREPER); formal adoption is the 
prerogative of the Council of Ministers; implementation is in the hands of the 
national administrations. Before final adoption by the Council, a Commission 
proposal will typically have been discussed in a working group comprising for 
the most part national officials; submitted to an advisory committee which 
includes outside experts; transmitted to COREPER to be discussed in the 
working group of national officials it sets up; reviewed by COREPER once 
more, and finally placed before the Council for approval.
The Commission’s discretion in the execution of Council directives has 
been tightly regulated by Council Decision 87/373/EEC of 13 July 1987 on the 
"comitology" system. The system consists of a large number of committees 
associated with the Commission in the exercise of its executive functions. Over 
the years, the system has become increasingly complex, including both advisory 
and oversight (so called "management" and "regulatory") committees. Regulatory 
and to some extent also management committees can block a Commission 
measure and transmit the case to the Council which can overrule the 
Commission.
Not surprisingly, many students of European integration have concluded 
that policy innovation in the EC is only possible when national preferences 
converge toward some new approach. Intergovemmentalist writers, in particular, 
rely on a model of least- common-denominator bargaining, a sort of Ricardian 
theory of Community policy making. As in Ricardo’s theory of economic rent 
the price of a good is determined by the unit cost of the output produced by the 
marginal firm so, according to intergovemmentalists, the quality of policy 




























































































(or marginal) government. Hence, barring special circumstances, the outcome 
will converge toward a least-common-denominator position.
Also writers not belonging to the intergovemmentalist school have denied 
the possibility of genuine policy innovation. According to these writers, the 
Community can hope, at best, "to generalize and diffuse solutions adopted in 
one or more Member States by introducing them throughout the Community. 
The solutions of these Member States normally set the framework for the 
Community solution" (Rehbinder and Stewart 1985:213).
Not even neo-functionalists thought it necessary to offer a theory of policy 
innovation. Ernst Haas explained the growth of European competences in terms 
of the "expansive logic of sectoral integration" (Haas 1958). He assumed a 
process of functional "spillovers" in which the initial decision of governments 
to delegate policy-making powers in a certain sector to a supranational 
institution inevitably creates pressures to expand the authority of that institution 
into neighbouring policy areas. Economics and technology, rather than political 
demands or policy entrepreneurship, would drive the result. Recent versions of 
neofunctionalism show greater awareness of the growing importance of 
innovation in the EC policy making system. Thus, the notion of "political 
spillover" (George 1993) emphasizes the role of supranational institutions and 
subnational actors in the process of functional spillover. Such empirical 
observations are not developed, however, into an explanation grounded in 
general theories of institutional behaviour.
In attempting to provide theoretical, rather than ad hoc, explanations for 
the apparently unstoppable growth of European regulations, I have found useful 
to distinguish different dimensions of policy growth: quantitative growth; 




























































































analytic distinction is due to the fact that rather different causal factors operate 
along the various dimensions.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents some examples and 
selected empirical evidence concerning the quantitative and qualitative growth 
of EC regulation in recent years. The crucial importance of regulation in EC 
policy making is explained in Section 3 by means of a model which has among 
its main variables the limited size of the Community budget and the low 
credibility of purely intergovernmental agreements in the field of regulation. 
Section 4 discusses the dynamics of delegation and control, while Section 5 
reviews some recent theories of policy entrepreneurship. Section 6 derives a 
number of positive and normative implications from the analysis developed in 
the previous sections. The paper concludes with some remarks on institutional 
reform.
2. Some Examples
Each of the three questions raised at the beginning of the introduction rests on 
a body of empirical evidence which is too extensive to be reviewed here; only 
a few suggestive examples will be presented. Concerning the phenomenon of 
over-regulation, one can mention the almost exponential growth of the number 
of directives and regulations produced, on average, each year: 25 directives and 
600 regulations by 1970; 50 directives and 1000 regulations by 1975; 80
__ 7 ^
directives and 1500 regulations per yeaf $ince 1985.
To compare: in 1991 Brussels issued 1564 directives and regulations as 
against 1417 pieces of legislation (laws, ordinances, decrees) issued by Paris, so 
that by now the Community introduces into the corpus of French law more rules 
than the national authorities. Moreover, according to some estimates, today only 




























































































parliament or the government in complete autonomy, that is, without any 
previous consultation in Brussels (Conseil d’Etat, 1992). It seems that Jacques 
Delors’s often quoted prediction that by 1998, 80 per cent of economic and 
social legislation will be of Community origin, while perhaps politically 
imprudent, did not lack solid empirical support.
Reporting such statistics, the French Conseil d’Etat speaks of normative 
drift ("dérive normative") and luxuriating legislation ("droit naturellement 
foisonnant"), doubting that any government could have foreseen, let alone 
wished, such a development. It also points out, however, that the same Member 
States that deplore the "furie réglementaire" of the Brussels authorities, are 
among the major causes of over-regulation — a point we shall examine more 
closely below. (V . •
Concerning the continuously expanding agenda of the Community, a 
suggestive indicator is the number of specialized councils of ministers, which 
went from 14 in 1984 to 21 in 1993. In addition to the traditional councils of 
the ministers of economics, finance, agriculture, trade and industry, we have 
now regular meetings of the ministers of the environment (since 1974), 
education (since 1974), research (since 1975), consumer affairs (since 1983), 
culture (since 1984), tourism (since 1988), civil protection (since 1988), 
telecommunications (since 1988).
Of seven important areas of current policy development -  regional policy, 
research and technological development, environment, consumer protection, 
education, cultural and audiovisual policy, and health and safety at work — only 
the latter was mentioned in the Treaty of Rome, and then only as an area where 
the Commission should promote close cooperation among the Member States 
(Art. 118, EEC). In the case of environmental protection, for example, three 




























































































explicitly recognized the competence of the Community in this area. If the first 
Action Programme (1973-6) lacked definite proposals, concentrating instead on 
general principles, subsequent documents became increasingly specific. The 
second programme (1977-81) indicated four main areas of intervention, while 
the third (1982-6) stressed the importance of environmental impact assessments 
and of economic instalments for implementing the "polluter pays" principle. 
Concrete actions followed. The number of environmental directives/decisions 
grew from 10 in 1975, to 13 in 1980, 20 in 1984, 25 in 1985, and 17 in the six 
months immediately preceding the passage of the SEA.
Consider, finally, genuine policy innovation as distinct from mere 
quantitative growth or task expansion. As already mentioned, many (perhaps 
most) students of EC policy making hold that Community policies cannot move 
beyond least-common-denominator solutions, unless the interests of the most 
important Member States favour some new approach. Thus, according to 
intergovemmentalist accounts of the internal market programme, the emphasis 
of the 1985 White Paper (COM(85)310, final) on mutual recognition reflects a 
change in the preferences of the Member States in the direction of less 
interventionist economic policies and a corollary shift toward deregulatory 
programmes (Keohane and Hoffman 1990: 288). Starting from the same 
assumption that the decisions of supranational institutions mirror the policy 
preferences of the most powerful political and economic actors in Europe, other 
authors have argued that the Cassis de Dijon ruling, which gave prominence to 
the principle of mutual recognition, was based on the reading of the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ) of the interest of the most influential Member States 
(Garrett 1992; Garrett and Weingast 1993).
A more careful analysis of the evidence reveals a rather different picture. 
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following anything but its own convictions. There is no mention of the idea of 
mutual recognition either in the argument of the plaintiffs’ lawyers or in the 
observations of the Commissions and the conclusions of the Advocate General 
(Dehousse 1994). Moreover, countries with a high level of health and safety 
standards such as France and Germany, realized that mutual recognition of such 
standards would entail competition among national regulators. Regulatory 
competition, it was feared, creates the conditions for "social dumping" as each 
country attempts to gain advantages for its own industry and to attract foreign 
investments by lowering the level of regulatory constraints which firms must 
meet. Hence countries with advanced systems of social regulation tended to 
support the traditional method of harmonizing national standards rather than 
their mutual recognition (Alter and Meunier-Aitsahalia 1993).
In fact, the Commission^’ rather than the Member States, had a strong 
reason for favouring reform of the traditional approach to harmonization. By the 
early 1980s, if not earlier, it had become clear that the attempt to achieve an 
integrated market by harmonizing thousands of laws and regulations of six, nine, 
and finally twelve countries at various levels of economic development and with 
vastly different legal, administrative and cultural traditions, was bound to fail.
A new approach was clearly needed. Already in the autumn 1979, the Internal
«Aw'‘
Market Commissioner suggested in front of the European Parliament that the 
harmonization policy should take a new direction, based on the Cassis 
judgement. In July 1980, the Commission sent an "interpretative 
Communication" to the Member States, the European Parliament, and the 
Council, boldly stating that Cassis would serve as the foundation for a new 
approach to harmonization. The Member States reacted with concern to the 
broad policy implications drawn by the Commission, in particular to the 





























































































the Council delivered a counter-interpretation of the case, arguing that the 
Commission’s generalization of the Court’s argument was excessive, and 
concluding that the Cassis ruling changed virtually nothing (Alter and Meunier- 
Aitsahalia 1993). In the event, the Commission’s broad interpretation prevailed. 
At the Milan meeting in June 1985, the Member States endorsed the White 
Paper and its mutual recognition strategy.
Even in the case of day-to-day policy making, the prevailing view seems 
to be that the Commission can at best diffuse throughout the Community 
solutions adopted in the most advanced Member States, see above. There are, 
it is admitted, some examples of genuine policy innovation. Thus, the 
Polychlorinated Biphenyl (PBC) Directive (76/769/EEC) "had no parallel in 
existing Member State regulations", while the Directive on sulphur dioxide limit 
values (80/779/EEC) established, on a Community-wide basis, ambient quality 
standards, which most Member States did not previously employ as a control 
strategy (Rehbinder and Stewart 1985: 214). However, lacking adequate 
theoretical explanations, such examples tend to be dismissed as special cases of 
no general significance.
Such a cavalier attitude can no longer be maintained. The SEA, by 
introducing qualified majority voting not only for internal-market legislation but
or
hM<
also for important areas of social regulation, has created suitable conditions f  
the development of striking regulatory innovations. For example, the framework 
Directive 89/391 on Health and Safety at Work goes beyond the regulatory 
philosophy and practice even of a country like Germany (Feldhoff 1992). 
Among the notable features of the directive are its scope (it applies to all sectors 
of activity, both public and private, including service, educational, cultural and 




























































































requirements concerning worker information, and the emphasis on participation 
and training.
Equally innovative are the Machinery Directive (89/392/EEC) and, in a 
more limited sphere, Directive 90/270 on health and safety for work with 
display screen equipment. Both directives rely on the concept of "working 
environment", which opens up the possibility of regulatory interventions in areas 
traditionally considered to be outside the field of occupational safety, and 
consider psychological factors like stress and fatigue important factors to be 
considered in a modem regulatory approach. It is difficult to find equally 
advanced principles in the legislation of any major industrialized country, inside 
or outside the EU.
In order to explain such policy outputs we need new, more analytical 
theories of the policy process in the Community. Such theories should be 
capable of explaining the qualitative deepening of EC regulation as well as its 
apparently unstoppable growth.
3. A Model o f Regulatory Policy Making
To understand policy making in the EC one must start from the basic fact that 
the budget of the EC is quite small, even after the significant increases of recent 
years. It represents less than 4 per cent of all the central government spending 
of the Member States and less than 1.3 per cent of the gross domestic product 
(GDP) of the Union. By comparison, between 45 and 50 per cent of the wealth 
produced in the Member States is spent by the national governments. The 
Community budget is not only small, but also rigid: almost 70 per cent of total 
appropriations consists of compulsory expenditures for programmes such as the 
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Second, it is important to distinguish between Itegulatory policies and 
policies involving the direct expenditure of public funds. Examples of the latter 
type are redistributive policies, which transfer resources from one group of 
individuals, regions or countries to another group, and distributive policies, such 
as public works or financial support for research and technological development, 
which allocate public resources among different activities. Now, an important 
characteristic of regulatory policy making is the limited influence of budgetary 
limitations on the activities of regulators. The size of direct-expenditure 
programmes is constrained by budgetary appropriations and, ultimately, by the 
size of government tax revenues. In contrast, the real costs of most regulatory 
programmes are borne directly by the firms and individuals that have to comply 
with them. Compared with these costs, the resources needed to produce the 
regulations are trivial. It is difficult to overstate the significance of this structural 
difference between regulatory and direct-expenditure policies. The distinction is 
especially important for the analysis of Community policy making since not only 
the economic but also the political and administrative costs of implementing EC 
regulations and directives are borne, directly or indirectly, by the Member 
States.
Third, I assume that the European Commission, like any other
X .......—
bureaucratic organization, attempts to maximize its influence, subject to, 
budgetary, political, and legal constraints.vThe present discussion focuses on the 
budgetary constraints. As already noted, the financial resources of the 
Community go, for the most part, to the Common Agricultural Policy and to a 
handful of distributive and redistributive programmes. The remaining resources 
are insufficient to support large scale initiatives in areas like industrial policy, 






































































































Commission to increase its role is to expand the scope of regulatory activities, 
even beyond the functional requirements of the common market.
As we saw in the preceding section, this strategy has been remarkably, 
some would say too successful, but the reasons for the success cannot be found 
only in the preferences of the Commission. The EC policy-making system 
includes many actors: industrialists, trade unions, public-interest groups, national 
and subnational politicians and bureaucrats, independent experts, and so on. The 
Commission plays a key role in the supply of Community regulation; we must 
now consider the demand side. In order to simplify the exposition, I shall only 
consider the most important actors on the demand side, the national governments 
(for a more detailed analysis, see Majone 1992, 1994a).
It may seem illogical, if not plainly wrong, to discuss the role of the 
Member States in the development of Community regulation under the heading 
of demand. After all, most legally binding acts have to be approved by the 
Council which represents the interests of the national governments and is 
supposed to be the real legislator in the EC system. Why not place the Member 
States and the Commission on the same side of the demand-and-supply equation, 
as "co-producers" of the regulatory outputs? Although this is the formally 
correct view, several factors suggest that from a policy-making point of view it 
is more useful to consider that national governments demand, rather than supply, 
EC regulation.
To begin with, there is considerable evidence that many Commission 
proposals are introduced at the suggestion of Member States (as well as of other 
actors such as the European Parliament, the Council of Ministers, the Economic 
and Social Committee, and private interests). For example, the German and 
Dutch governments played a key role in the initiation and drafting of EC 




























































































exerted considerable pressure on the Commission to liberalize the market for life 
and non-life insurance where British insurers enjoy a comparative advantage 
over their competitors on the continent. According to the report of the French
directives presented by the Commission as of 1991, only 6% appear to be 
"spontaneous initiatives", so that the overwhelming majority of proposals would 
actually be produced on the demand of Member States or other actors.
A second and theoretically more important factor has to do with the issue 
of policy credibility. As noted in the introduction, it is not a priori obvious why 
Member States would be willing to delegate regulatory powers extending well 
beyond the level required by the founding treaty or by the logic of functional 
spillovers in an increasingly integrated market. As Ronald Coase (1960) has 
shown in a famous article, the presence of negative externalities does not in 
itself prevent effective coordination among independent actors.
A significant implication of Coase’s theorem is that the rationale for 
supranational regulation is regulatory failure rather than market failure. Market 
failures with international impacts, such as transboundary pollution, could be 
managed in a cooperative (intergovernmental) fashion without the necessity of 
delegating regulatory powers to a supranational body, provided that national 
regulators were willing and able to take into account the international 
repercussions of their choices; that they had sufficient knowledge of one 
another’s intentions; that the (transaction) costs of organizing and monitoring 
policy cooperation were not too high; and especially that they could trust each 
other to implement in good faith their joint decisions.
International regulatory failure occurs when one or more of these 
conditions are not satisfied. For example, it is usually difficult to observe 
whether intergovernmental regulatory agreements are kept or not. This is




























































































because much economic and social regulation is discretionary. Because 
regulators lack information that only regulated firms have, and because 
governments for political reasons are reluctant to impose excessive cost on 
industry, bargaining is an essential feature of the process of regulatory 
enforcement. Regardless of what the law says, the process of regulation is not 
simply one where the regulators command and the regulated obey. A "market" 
is created over the precise obligations of the latter (Peacok 1984). Since 
bargaining is so pervasive, it may be impossible for an outside observer to 
determine whether or not an international regulation has been, in fact, violated.
When it is difficult to observe whether governments are making an honest 
effort to enforce a cooperative agreement, the agreement is not credible. One 
solution is to delegate regulatory tasks to a supranational authority with powers 
of monitoring and of imposing sanctions. Sometimes governments have 
problems of credibility not just in the eyes of each other, but in the eyes of third 
parties such as regulated firms. Thus, where pollution has international effects 
and fines impose significant competitive disadvantages on firms that compete 
internationally, firms are likely to believe that national regulators will be 
unwilling to prosecute them as rigorously if they determine the level of 
enforcement unilaterally rather than under supranational supervision. Hence the 
transfer of regulatory powers to a supranational authority like the European 
Commission, by making more stringent regulation credible, may improve the 
behaviour of regulated firms (Gatsios and Seabright 1989). Also, because the 
Commission is involved in the regulation of a large number of firms throughout 
the European Union, it has much more to gain by being tough in any individual 
case than a national regulator: weak enforcement would destroy its credibility 
in the eyes of more firms. Thus it may be more willing to enforce sanctions than 
































































































no different (ib.: 50). The fact that the Commission is involved in the regulation 
of a large number of firms throughout Europe also explains why it is less 
vulnerable to the risk of "regulatory capture" than national regulators.
Perhaps the greatest advantage of EC membership in a period of far- 
reaching policy changes, is the possibility of delegating politically difficult 
decisions (such as the elimination of state aid to industry, the enforcement of 
competition rules, trade liberalization and strict implementation of environmental 
regulations during economic recession) to supranational non-majoritarian 
institutions (Majone 1994b). By showing that their hands are tied by European 
rules, Member States can increase the international credibility of their policy 
commitments and, at the same time, reduce the power of redistributive coalitions 
at home. In sum, the low credibility of purely intergovernmental agreements, 
together with the advantage of shifting politically difficult decisions to a non- 
majoritarian institution, explains the willingness of the Member States to 
delegate important regulatory powers to the Commission. In the next section we 
explore the consequences of this delegation.
f  m /a ^\T £ *
4. The Dynamics o f Delegation and Control
The delegation of extensive powers of adjudication and policy making to 
supranational institutions is what distinguishes the EC from more traditional 
international regimes. Its implications are still poorly understood, however. 
Neither neofunctionalists nor intergovemmentalists have seriously considered the 
dynamics of delegation and control; the former because of their faith in the 
automatism of functional spillovers, the latter because of their assumption that 
supranational institutions simply provide a smooth, faithful translation of 
national interests into policy. To analyze the consequences of the delegation of 
policy making powers, and the possibilities of political control one must turn to





























































































the literature on jpolitical-bureaucratic and principal-agent relations rather than
to traditional theories of European integration.
The thrust of much recent research on political-bureaucratic relations is 
that bureaucracy has a substantial degree of autonomy, and that direct political 
control is rather weak (Wilson 1980; Moe 1987, 1990; Majone 1994c). 
Oversight for purposes of serious policy control is time-consuming, costly, and 
difficult to do well under conditions of uncertainty and complexity. At any rate, 
legislators are concerned more with satisfying voters to increase the probability 
of re-election than with overseeing the bureaucracy. As a result, they do not 
typically invest their scarce resources in general policy control. Instead, they 
prefer to intervene quickly, inexpensively and in ad hoc ways to protect 
particular clients in particular matters (Mayhew 1974). Hence legislative 
oversight is un-coordinated and fragmented. Similarly, the literature on the 
budgetary process has cast doubts on the budget as an effective tool of control. 
As Wildavsky (1964) discovered, budgeting is decentralized and incremental, 
resulting in automatic increases that further insulate the bureaucracy from 
political control.
New theories based on the principal-agent model give a somewhat more 
positive assessment of the possibility of political control of the bureaucracy. 
According to agency theory political control is possible because elected 
politicians create bureaucracies. They design administrative institutions with 
incentive structures to facilitate control, and they monitor bureaucratic activities 
to offset information asymmetries. Thus, agency theory, like recent versions of 
intergovemmentalism (Moravcsik 1993), posits well-informed central decision 
makers who systematically mold the preferences of bureaucratic agents and are 




























































































However, the process is considerably more complex than envisaged by 
these theories. In the delegation phase, political principals do have the freedom 
to select their agents and impose an incentive structure on their behaviour. Over 
time, however, bureaucrats accumulate job-specific expertise, and this "asset 
specificity" (Williamson 1985) alters the original relationship. Now politicians 
must deal with agents they once selected, and in these dealings the bureaucrats 
have an advantage in technical and operational expertise. As a result, they are 
increasingly able to pursue their objective of greater autonomy. As Terry Moe 
(1990: 143) writes:
Once an agency is created, the political world becomes 
a different place. Agency bureaucrats are now political 
actors in their own right: they have career and 
institutional interests that may not be entirely 
congruent with their formal missions, and they have 
powerful resources -- expertise and delegated authority 
— that might be employed toward these "selfish" ends.
They are now players whose interests and resources 
alter the political game.
This recent research on political-bureaucratic relations throws considerable 
light on the dynamics of delegation and control in the EC context. Also for the 
representatives of the Member States in the Council of Ministers oversight for 
purposes of serious policy control is costly, time-consuming, and difficult to do 
well. Hence their unwillingness to invest scarce resources in such activities. As 
was mentioned in Section 2, the "comitology" system is an attempt to control 
the Commission’s discretion in the execution of Council directives. Regulatory 
and management committees created under this system can block a Commission 
measure and transmit the case to the Council, which can overrule the 
Commission. Even in the case of such committees, however, the Commission 




























































































1991: 107). According to the most detailed empirical study of the comitology 
system to-date "Commission officials generally do not think that their committee 
significantly reduced the Commission’s freedom and even less that it has been 
set up to assure the Member States’s control" (Institut fur Europaische Politik 
1989: 9). According to the same study, the Council acts only rarely on the 
complex technical matters dealt with by the comitology committees, but when 
it does, its decisions mostly support the Commission’s original proposals 
(ib.:123). In fact, the Commission has reported overwhelming (98 per cent) 
acceptance of its proposals by the various regulatory committees (Eichener 
1992).
Also in the case of policy initiation, the formal procedure according to 
which Commission proposals are discussed in a working group comprising 
national experts, submitted to an advisory committee, and reviewed by 
COREPER, gives an impression of tight control that does not correspond to 
reality. What is known about the modus operandi of the advisory committees 
and working groups suggests that debates there follow substantive rather than 
national lines. A good deal oijzopinage technocratique\ develops between 
Commission officials and national experts interested in discovering pragmatic 
solutions rather than defending political positions (Eichener 1992). By the time 
a Commission proposal reaches the Council of Ministers all the technical details 
have been worked out and modifications usually leave the essentials untouched.
In part, this is because although the Council with its working groups can 
monitor the activities of the Commission, it cannot compete with the expertise 
at the disposal of the Commission and its Directorates (Peters 1992: 119). The 
offices of the Commission responsible for a particular policy area form the 
central node of a vast "issue network" that includes, in addition to the experts 




























































































environmental, consumer and other public-interest advocates, representatives of 
economic interests, professional organizations and sub-national governments.
Commission officials engage in extensive discussions with all these actors 
but remain free to choose whose ideas and proposals to adopt. The variety of 
policy positions, which is typically much greater than at the national level, 
increases the freedom of choice of European officials. It may even happen that 
national experts find the Commission a more receptive forum for new ideas than 
their own administration. The important Machinery Directive (89/392/EEC) 
mentioned in section 2, offers a striking example of this. The crucially important 
technical annex of the directive was drafted by a British labour expert who 
originally had sought to reform the British approach to safety at the workplace. 
Having failed to persuade the policy makers of his own country, he brought his 
innovative ideas to Brussels, where they were welcomed by Commission 
officials and eventually become European law (Eichener 1992: 52).
/zvw CAM  tv  I -
5. Policy Entrepreneurship C h , A -
The existence of large margins of regulatory discretion is a necessary but not a
& '
sufficient condition for genuine policy innovation. We must also consider the 
capacity of Commission officials to play the role of policy entrepreneurs. 
Kingdon (1984) describes policy entrepreneurs as constantly on the look out for 
windows of opportunity through which to push their preferred ideas. Policy 
windows open on those relatively infrequent occasions when three usually 
separate process streams -  problems, politics, and policy ideas — come together. 
Policy entrepreneurs concerned about a particular problem search for solutions 
in the stream of policy ideas to couple to their problem, then try to take 
advantage of political receptivity at certain points in time to push the package 
of problem and solution.
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A successful policy entrepreneur possesses three basic qualities: first, he 
must be taken seriously either as an expert, as a leader of a powerful interest 
group, or as an authoritative decision maker; second, he must be known for his 
political connections or negotiating skills; third, and probably most important, 
successful entrepreneurs are persistent (Kingdon 1984: 189-90). Because of the 
way they are recruited, the structure of their career incentives, and the crucial 
role of the Commission in policy initiation, Commission officials often display 
the qualities of a successful policy entrepreneur to a degree unmatched by 
national civil servants.
In particular, the Commission exhibits the virtue of persistence to an 
extraordinary degree. Most important policy innovations in the EC have been 
achieved after many years during which the Commission persisted in its attempts 
to "soften up" the opposition of the Member States, while waiting for a window 
of opportunity to open. A textbook example is the case of the Merger Control 
Regulation approved by the Council on December 21,1989, after more than 20 
years of political wrangling.
As far back as 1965, the Commission argued that the Treaty of Rome was 
seriously deficient without the power to control mergers. The following year it 
asked a group of experts to study the problem of concentrations in the Common 
Market. The majority of the group held that article 85 of the Rome Treaty could 
be applied to "monopolizing" mergers, but the Commission chose to follow the 
contrary opinion of the minority. It did, however, accept the majority view 
concerning the applicability of article 86 to mergers involving one company 
already in a dominant position in the Common Market. The European Court of 






























































































At the beginning of 1974 the European Parliament and the Economic and 
Social Committee approved by large majorities a proposal for a merger control 
regulation, but the Member States were not yet prepared to grant the 
Commission the powers it requested. A long period of inaction followed. The 
process was again set in motion by the path -- breaking Philip Morris 
Judgement of 17 November 1987 in which the Court of Justice held, against the 
then prevalent legal opinion, that article 85 does apply to the acquisition by one 
company of an equity interest in a competitor where the effect is to restrict or 
distort competition. The Commission warmly endorsed the Court’s decision. It 
was clear that another important step, after Continental Can, had been taken on 
the road toward the control of merger activities with a "Community dimension". 
In the meanwhile, the "Europe 1992" programme for the completion of the 
internal market had stimulated waves of mergers. This development opened the 
window of opportunity the Commission had been waiting for so long. 
Centralized merger control of Community-wide mergers could now be presented 
as essential for success in completing the internal market. Finally, the 
convergence of Kingdon’s three streams of problems, politics, and policy ideas 
produced the 1989 Merger Control Regulation.
Member States. Only through this new approach to harmonization could the 
objectives of the internal market programme be achieved in time. In turn, the
This episode in the history of EC policy making provides a clear 
illustration of the persistence and entrepreneurial skills of the Commission, but 
also supports a more general point, namely that an adequate explanation of 
policy development in the EC must be rooted in the dynamics of the entire 
system, and must pay serious attention to the relationships of mutual dependence j 
among European institutions. Thus, in section 2 we mentioned the strategic 






























































































new approach was made possible by the actions and decisions of both the 
Commission and the Court of Justice. The relationship of mutual dependence of 
these two institutions has been expressed very well by Alter and Meunier- 
Aitsahalia (1994: 19): "The Cassis decision advanced the idea of mutual
recognition, and the entrepreneurship of the Commission put the issue on the 
table and forced a debate. Both the decision itself and the Commission’s 
response were necessary to produce the new harmonization policy. The legal 
decision was needed to encourage the Commission to issue its bold 
Communication ... The Commission’s Communication, however, was also 
necessary in order to bring the legal decision into the political arena."
Combining concepts from public choice theory with historical case 
studies, William Riker (1986) provides additional insights into the strategies 
used by policy entrepreneurs to change existing political coalitions. He argues 
that through agenda setting, strategic behaviour, and especially through the 
introduction of new policy dimensions to political debate, the entrepreneur can 
break up existing equilibria in order to create new and more profitable political 
outcomes. The successful entrepreneur "probes until he finds some new 
alternative, some new dimension that strikes a spark in the preferences of 
others" (ib.:64).
A good example of this strategy is the introduction by the Commission 
of the concept of working environment into the Europe — wide debate on health 
and safety at work. As was mentioned in section 2, this concept opens up the 
possibility of regulatory interventions in areas such as ergonomics traditionally 
considered to be outside the field of occupational safety. In view of the claims 
by intergovemmentalists that Community policy making is under the control of 
the most powerful Member States, it should be pointed out that the important 




























































































occupational safety (see Section 2) were inspired by the regulatory philosophy 
of two small countries — the Netherlands and Denmark which first introduced 
the concept of working environment into their legislation — and opposed by 
Germany in order to preserve the power and traditional approach of its own 
regulatory bodies (Feldhoff 1992; Eichener 1992).
0*
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6. Positive and Normative Implications 
As was suggested in the introduction, in order to understand the development 
and growth of regulatory policies in the EC it is important to distinguish 
between different manifestations of the phenomenon: quantitative growth, 
regulatory complexity, task expansion, and "deepening", that is, genuine policy 
innovation. The theories discussed in the preceding pages suggest a number of 
observations concerning these various dimensions of development and growth.
The model of demand and supply of EC regulation sketched in Section 
3 seeks to explain regulatory origin rather than the ongoing regulatory process. 
Nevertheless, the model has significant implications for the issues raised in this 
paper. It will be recalled that the main explanatory variables, in addition to the 
Commission’s desire to increase its influence, are the budget constraint and the 
low credibility of intergovernmental regulatory agreements,.
Paradoxically, the attempt of the Member States to limit the scope of
supranational policies by imposing a tight and rigid budget constraint on the
Commission, has favoured the development of a mode of policy making that is
largely immune from budgetary discipline. As an American student and
practitioner of regulation writes:
Budget and revenue figures are good summaries of 
what is happening in welfare, defense, or tax policy, 
and can be used to communicate efficiently with the 
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interest-group contention ... In the world of regulation, 
however, where the government commands but nearly 
all the rest takes place in the private economy, we 
generally lack good aggregate numbers to describe 
what is being "taxed" and "spent" in pursuit of public 
policies. Instead we have lists -  endless lists of 
projects the government would like others to undertake 
(De Muth 1984:25). _________________ _ ____
Thus, continuous expansion is a structural feature of regulatory policy making,
and not only or even primarily the result of functional spillovers and the 
"expansive logic of sectoral integration" as neo-functionalists argued. Two 
additional factors contribute to the seemingly unstoppable growth of European 
regulation. First it has already been mentioned that the great majority of recent 
EC regulations and directives are not the result of "spontaneous initiatives" of 
the Commission, but rather of demands coming especially from individual 
Member States and the Council, but also from the European Parliament, the 
Economic and Social Committee, regional governments, and various private and 
public interest groups. The possibility granted by the Maastricht Treaty to the 
European Parliament to ask the Commission to submit legislative proposals can 
only strengthen this trend.
While the responsiveness of the Commission to such requests may 
increase its political legitimacy, uncontrolled and un-coordinated demands can 
produce a number of negative consequences, of which legislative inflation is the 
most obvious one. These consequences are aggravated by institutional factors. 
Because the European Commission is a collegial body, central coordination of 
the regulatory programmes of the different Directorates General (DGs) is quite 
difficult. Lack of central coordination leads to serious inconsistencies across and 
within regulatory programmes, lack of rational procedures for selecting policy 
priorities, and insufficient attention to the cost-effectiveness of individual rules.
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One method of reducing over-regulation would be to create an institution 
with the power to oversee the entire regulatory process and to discipline the 
activity of the DGs by comparing the social benefits of proposed regulations 
with the costs imposed on the European economy by the regulatory 
requirements. Such an institution or "regulatory clearing house" should be 
established at the highest level of the Commission. DGs would be asked to 
submit to it annually draft regulatory programmes for review. When 
disagreements or serious inconsistencies arise, the President of the Commission 
or a "Working Committee on Regulation" would be asked to intervene. This 
review process would help the Commission to screen demands for EC 
regulations and to shape a consistent set of regulatory measures to submit to the 
Council and the European Parliament. The usefulness of the procedure could 
be enhanced by coordinating the regulatory review with the normal budgetary 
review, thus linking the level of budgetary appropriations to the cost- 
effectiveness of the different regulatory programmes (Majone 1992).
Let us now consider the issue of regulatory complexity. Many students 
of EC policy making have observed that EC directives exhibit a much greater 
level of technical detail than comparable national legislation. The widespread 
opinion that this level of complexity is due to the technical perfectionism of the 
Commission lacks plausibility: the Commission is very small relative to its 
tasks, has limited resources, and is largely composed of generalists, not of 
technical experts.^Rather, it is the distrust of the Member States which is largely 
responsible for regulatory complexity.  ̂Doubting the commitment of other 
governments to honest implementation of European rules, and being generally 
unfamiliar with different national styles of administration, national 
representatives insist on spelling out mutual obligations in the greatest possible 
detail, including at times chemical, statistical or mathematical formulas.
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Member States not only mistrust each other; they also mistrust the 
Commission. As noted in Section 4, in order to limit the discretion of the 
Commission they have created a complex system of working groups and 
advisory committees largely staffed by national experts. For the reasons given
above, the system is not very effective in reducing the freedom of choice of the j J, ,
.______ ______ N f . ' ”"
Commission, but it introduces a strong technical bias into the regulatory process.
■■■■ ....  | r - ' '
This is because most national experts are narrow technical specialists more
interested in process and technical details than in cost-effective and easy-to-
implement solutions. This technical bias, combined with the reluctance of the
Council to engage in serious policy control and the lack of central oversight at
the Commission level, is probably another factor contributing to regulatory
complexity.
This hypothesis is supported by more general theoretical considerations.
Some economists have argued that an explanation of regulatory complexity does 
not need to rest on peculiar interests of the regulators but on economic interests 
of third parties, namely specialists in various aspects of regulation such as 
lawyers, accountants, engineers or safety experts. Unlike other interest groups, 
these experts care more about the process than the product of regulation. They 
have an interest in regulatory complexity because complexity increases the value 
of their expertise. Thus, "red tape" may not simply be evidence of bureaucratic 
inefficiency or ineptness. Rather, in part, "red tape" is a private interest that 
arises because a complex regulatory environment allows for specialization in 
rule making and "rule intermediation" (Kearl 1983; Quandt 1983).
In 1985 the Commission has introduced a new approach to technical 
regulation with the explicit objective of reducing regulatory complexity 
(COM(85), 310 final). In essence, the new approach proposes a conceptual 




























































































essential, and those that can be left to the sphere of voluntary technical norms 
(the principle of "reference to standards"), or where it is sufficient that there be 
mutual recognition of the requirements laid down by national laws. In practice, 
the new approach replaces the multitude of specification standards (also called 
process or engineering standards) by a few performance standards which a 
product must satisfy in order to secure the right of free movement throughout 
the single European market.
The technical specifications formulated by European standardization 
bodies (such as the European Standardization Committee, CEN, and the 
European Standardization Committee for Electrical Products, CENELEC) are not 
binding and retain their character of voluntary standards. However, governments 
are obliged to presume that products manufactured in accordance with European 
standards (or, temporarily, with national standards when no European ones are 
yet available) comply with the "fundamental requirements" or performance 
standards stipulated in the directive (Pelkmans 1987). The system is completed 
by the mutual recognition of testing and certification procedures.
The new methodology is a highly innovative approach to supranational 
regulation in general, and to the problem of regulatory complexity in particular, 
but its success depends crucially on the level of mutual trust among the Member 
States. Absent mutual trust, national regulators may upset the delicate balance 
between different and potentially conflicting objectives -  satisfying essential 
requirements of health and safety and preventing the creation of non-tariff 
barriers through regulation — on which mutual recognition rests. The experience 
with the mutual recognition of approvals of new medical drugs, provides a 
graphic illustration of this point.
For more than two decades the Commission has attempted to harmonize 



























































































criteria for testing new products, and the mutual recognition of toxicological and 
clinical trials conducted according to EC rules. Under the "multi-state drug 
application procedure" (MSAP) introduced in 1975, a company that has received 
a marketing authorization from the regulatory agency of a Member State may 
ask for the mutual recognition of that approval by at least five other countries. 
The agencies of the countries nominated by the company must approve or raise 
objections within 120 days. In case of objections, the Committee for Proprietary 
Medicinal Products (CPMP) — which includes national experts and Commission 
representatives -  has to be notified. The CPMP must express its opinion within 
60 days; within another 30 days it may be overruled by the national agency that 
has raised objections.
Unfortunately, the procedure has not worked well: national regulators did 
not appear to be bound either by decisions of other regulatory bodies, or by the 
opinions of the CPMP. Even a new, simplified procedure introduced in 1983 
did not succeed in streamlining the approval process, since national regulators 
continued to raise objections against each other almost routinely (Kaufer 1990). 
These difficulties finally convinced the Commission to proposed the 
establishment of a European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products 
and the creation of a new centralized Community procedure -- compulsory for 
biotechnology products and certain types of veterinary medicines, and available 
on an optional basis for other products -  leading to a Community authorization 
(Commission of the European Communities 1990). y
As this example shows, a good deal of decentralization would be possible 
if only national regulators would trust each other more. Often mistrust reflects 
insufficient appreciation of different regulatory philosophies and national styles 
of policy making. However, in some cases regulators have low international 




























































































technical expertise, financial resources and policy infrastructure needed to deal 
effectively with complex regulatory issues. In such cases, Community assistance 
may be needed to ensure that all Member States achieve a level of competence 
sufficient to support mutual trust and to make mutual recognition, possible.
The gist of the argument presented so far is that national governments and 
regulatory authorities bear a considerable share of the responsibility for the 
volume and complexity of EC regulation. Hence, remedies should first be sought 
at the level of the Member States, although more centralized control of 
regulatory programmes within the Commission would be helpful too. Where the 
policy entrepreneurship of the Commission becomes important is in explaining 
the progressive "deepening" of EC regulations.
In Sections 4 and 5 1 have discussed in general terms the conditions which 
make policy entrepreneurship possible, and the most important strategies 
followed by successful entrepreneurs. Here I consider a particular, but 
significant, aspect of "deepening": the fact that some of the most striking 
examples of policy innovation in the EÇ'are in the are of social regulation (see 
Section 2). There is, of course, a straightforward explanation for this. Clearly, 
there is limited scope for innovation when policies are either prescribed by 
treaty — the case of competition, agriculture or trade policies — or represent a 
necessary response to the functional needs of an increasingly integrated market - 
- rules concerning the free movement of goods, services, capitals and people. At 
least since the Single European Act, social regulation does not have to be 
justified in functional terms, and thus offers greater scope for entrepreneurship 
and innovation than traditional EC policies.
However, a more interesting explanation is suggested by James 
Q.Wilson’s well known taxonomy of regulatory policies according to the pattern 
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entrepreneurial politics correspond to policies that confer general (though 
perhaps small) benefits at a cost to be borne by a small segment of society. 
Most social regulation falls into this category. The costs of cleaner air and 
water, safer products, and better working conditions are borne, at least initially, 
by particular segments of industry. Since the incentive to organize is strong for 
the opponents of the policy but weak for the beneficiaries, social regulatory 
measures can be passed only if there is a policy entrepreneur who can mobilize 
public sentiment, put the opponents of the measures on the defensive, and. 
associate the proposed regulation with widely shared values.
According to Wilson, the entrepreneur is the vicarious representative of 
groups not directly part of the legislative process. This observation helps 
understanding the growing importance of social regulation, and hence of 
entrepreneurial politics, in the EC. Historically, diffuse interests have been 
poorly represented in Europe because traditional forms of state intervention 
tended to favour producers -- capitalists and unionized workers — at the expense 
of consumer interests. Also, political systems characterized by strong party 
control of both the executive and the legislature, and highly centralized public
bureaucracies impeded the emergence of independent political entrepreneur.
$  f'-mrvu't t^vyTH
On the other hand, the insulation of the Commission, a non-majoritarian 
institution, from partisan politics, the activism of the European Court of Justice, 
and the efforts of the European Parliament to define its own distinctive role, are 
all factors that explain why diffuse interests are often more effectively protected 
at the European than at the national level. Critics of regulatory growth in the EC 
should not forget than in most Member States consumer-protection legislation 
and even environmental policies were poorly developed, when not entirely 
lacking, before national governments were forced to implement European




























































































7. Conclusion: Toward Institutional Reform
There is general agreement that a Community of 16, 20, or more members could 
not function under present rules: institutional reform is urgently needed. 
Although this paper is not specifically concerned with this vast topic, some of 
its findings may be relevant to the broader issue.
A first point of methodological interest is that one should not 
overemphasize the sui generis nature of the Community, but rather attempt to 
distinguish between idiosyncratic problems and those that can be more generally 
ascribed to a mode of policy making or method of governance. Thus, over­
regulation is a general problem, though it may be aggravated by the particular 
institutional arrangements and peculiar politics of the Community. It follows 
that reform proposals should not be devised on an ad hoc basis, but should be 
inspired by general principles.
This applies also to fundamental political issues like the "democratic 
deficit" of Community institutions, in particular the Commission. As I have 
argued elsewhere, a problem of democratic accountability arises whenever 
important policy-making powers are delegated to non-majoritarian institutions 
such as politically independent central banks and regulatory commissions. To 
discuss the problem exclusively in the context of EC institutions is to run the 
risk of neglecting relevant national experiences in favour of ad hoc and possibly 
flawed solutions.
Second, our discussion of over-regulation and regulatory complexity
suggests that it is unhelpful, as well as unfair, to blame the Commission for all----- - -----
the dysfunctions of policy making at the European level. If it is true that the 
Member States have their share of responsibility then institutional reform should 
begin at home. One of the central themes of this paper is the overwhelming 
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cannot succeed when national regulators do not trust each other. But similar 
problems will arise also in the practical applications of the principle of 
subsidiarity. This is because national and subnational governments may be more 
attuned to individual tastes, but they are unlikely to make a clean separation 
between providing public goods for their citizens and engaging in policies 
designed to advantage the country or region at the expense of its neighbours. 
For example, local authorities have sometimes controlled air pollution by 
requiring extremely tall smokestacks on industrial facilities. With tall stacks, by 
the time the emissions descend to ground level they are usually in the next city, 
region or country, and so of no concern to the jurisdiction where they were 
emitted. Until regulators can trust each other to avoid such selfish strategies, 
centralization of regulatory authority is the only practical way of correcting 
transboundary externalities, or to prevent that the local regulation of a local 
market failure may become a trade barrier.
One final point about decision-making procedures. As already mentioned, 
the regulatory activities of the Commission are supported by a dense network 
of consultative, regulatory, and management committees. Moreover, at the end 
of October, 1993, decisions were taken by the Member States concerning the 
establishment and location of ten new administrative bodies. These include, in 
addition to the forerunner of the European Central Bank, the European Monetary 
Institute located in Frankfurt, the European Environmental Agency, the Office 
of Veterinary and Phytosanitary Inspection and Control; the European Centre for 
the Control of Drugs and Drug Addition; the European Agency for the 
Evaluation of Medicinal Products, and the Agency for Health and Safety at 
Work.
This proliferation of technical committees and specialized agencies further 






























































































of transparency of their decision-making processes. Because of the opacity of 
the procedures, it is difficult for the citizens of the Union to identify the body 
which is responsible for decisions that apply to them, and the legal remedies that
A similar situation arose in the United States at the time of the New Deal, 
which saw a dramatic growth in government intervention. The establishment of 
new specialized agencies, the functions of which were extremely complex and 
varied, created a need for rules to ensure that they did not act arbitrarily or 
unlawfully. In the absence of a true administrative law tradition, the rules 
governing the federal administration had developed in a piecemeal fashion as 
they had been worked out in response to ad hoc needs. However, such an 
approach was deemed insufficient to cope with the changes under way. The 
Administrative Procedures Act (APA) adopted by Congress in 1946, aimed to 
legitimize the growth of federal bureaucracy by providing a single set of rules 
explaining the procedures to be followed by federal agencies and providing for 
judicial review of many of their decisions.
I submit that the Community could usefully draw on such a precedent. 
The enactment of an EC Administrative Procedures Act would provide the 
Community with a unique opportunity to decide what kind of rules are more 
likely to rationalize decision making, to what extent interest groups should be 
given access to the regulatory process, or when judicial review is necessary. 
Even if it were to limit itself to the writing of existing practices into the law, as 
the APA largely did, the adoption of a single set of administrative rules would 
at least provide for a hard core of provisions applicable to the developing 
regulatory process. Such a move would bear witness to the unwillingness of the 
EC and its Member States to allow an unregulated growth of the Community’s 
administrative functions.




























































































A - " ’ 33
References
Alter, Karen J. and Sophie Meunier-Aitsahalia (1993): "Judicial Politics in the 
European Community: European Integration and the Pathbrealdng Cassis de 
Dijon Decision", Paper presented at the European Community Studies 
Association Conference, Washington, D.C., May 27-29, 1993.
Coase, Ronald (1960): "The Problem of Social Cost", The Journal o f Law and 
Economics, 3, 1-44.
Commission of the European Communities (1985): Completing the Internal 
Market, COM(85) 310 final. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the 
European Communities.
Commission of the European Communities (1990): Future System for the Free 
Movement o f Medicinal Drugs in the European Community, COM(90) 283 final, 
Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities.
Conseil d’Etat (1992): Rapport Public 1992, Paris: La Documentation Française, 
Etudes et Documents No.44.
Dehousse, Renaud (1994): La Cour de Justice des Communautés Européennes, 
Paris: Montchrétien.
De Muth, Christopher C. (1984): "A Strategy for Regulatory Reform", 
Regulation, 4, 25-30.
Eichener, Volkner (1992): Social Dumping or Innovative Regulation ?, Florence: 
European University Institute, Working Paper SPS No.92/28.
Feldhoff, Kerstin (1992): Grundzüge des Europdischen Arbeitsum-weltrechts, 
mimeo., Bochum: Ruhr Universitàt.
Garrett, Geoffrey (1992): "International Cooperation and Institutional Choice: 
The European Community’s Internal Market", International Organization, 46, 
533-560.
Garrett, Geoffrey and Barry Weingast (1993): "Ideas, Interests and Institutions: 




























































































R.Keohane (eds.): Ideas and Foreign Policy, Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University 
Press.
Gatsios, Kristos and Paul Seabright (1989): "Regulation in the European 
Community", Oxford Review o f Economic Policy, 5, no.2, 37-60.
George, Stephen (1993): "Supranational Actors and Domestic Politics: 
Integration Theory Reconsidered in the Light of the Single European Act and 
Maastricht", Sheffield: mimeo.
Haas, Ernst (1958): The Uniting o f Europe: Political, Social and Economic 
Forces, 1950-1957, Stanford, CAL: Stanford University Press.
Institut fur Europaische Politik (1989): "Comitology": Characteristics, 
Performance and Options, Bonn: Preliminary Final Report.
Kaufer, Erich (1990): "The Regulation of New Product Development in the 
Drug Industry", in G.Majone (ed.), Deregulation or Re-Regulation? London: 
Pinter Publishers, 223-251.
Kearl, John R. (1983): "Rules, Rule Intermediaries and the Complexity and 
Stability of Regulation", Journal o f Public Economics, 22, 215-226.
Keohane, Robert and Stanley Hoffman (1990): "Community Policy and 
Institutional Change" in W. Wallace (ed.) The Dynamics o f European Integration, 
London: Pinter Publishers.
Kingdon, John W. (1984): Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policy, Boston: 
Little, Brown.
Ludlow, Paul (1991): "The European Commission", in R.Keohane and 
S.Hoffman (eds.) The New European Community: Decisionmaking and 
Institutional Change, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 85-132.
Majone, Giandomenico (1992): "Market Integration and Regulation: Europe after 
1992", Metroeconomica, 43, 1-2, 131-156.
Majone, Giandomenico (1994a): "The Rise of the Regulatory State in Europe", 




























































































Majone, Giandomenico (1994b): "Independence vs. Accountability? Non- 
Majoritarian Institutions and Democratic Government in Europe", in JJ.Hesse 
(ed.), The European Yearbook on Comparative Government and Public 
Administration 1994 , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Majone, Giandomenico (1994c): "Controlling Regulatory Bureaucracies: Lessons 
from the American Experience", in H.U.Derlien, U.Gerhardt, F.W.Scharpf (eds.): 
Systemrationalitat und Partialinteresse, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 291-314.
Mayhew, David R. (1974): Congress: The Electoral Connection, New Haven, 
CT: Yale University Press.
Moe, Terry M. (1987): "Interests, Institutions and Positive Theory: The Politics 
of the NLRB", Studies in American Political Development, 2, 236-299.
Moe, Terry M. (1990): "The Politics of Structural Choice: Toward a Theory of 
Public Bureaucracy", in O.E. Williamson (ed.): Organization Theory from 
Chester Barnard to the Present, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 116-153.
Moravcsik, Andrew (1993): "Preferences and Power in the European 
Community: A Liberal Intergovemmentalist Approach", Journal of Common 
Market Studies, 31, 4, 473-524.
Peacock, Alan (1984): The Regulation Game, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Pelkmans, Jacques (1987): "The New Approach to Technical Harmonization and 
Standardization", Journal o f Common Market Studies, 25, 3, 249-269.
Peters, Guy, B. (1992): "Bureaucratic Politics and the Institutions of the 
European Community", in Alberta M.Sbragia (ed.), Europolitics, Washington, 
D.C.: The Brookings Institution.
Quandt, Richard E. (1983): "Complexity in Regulation", Journal of Public 
Economics, 22, 199-214.
Rehbinder, Eckhardt and Richard Stewart (1985): Environmental Protection 
Policy, Berlin: de Gruyter.





























































































Wildavsky, Aaron (1964): The Budgetary Process, Boston: Little, Brown.
Wilson, James Q. (1980) (Hg.): The Politics o f Regulation, New York: Basic 
Books.
Williamson, Oliver E. (1985): The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, New 
York: The Free Press.
Wood, Dan B. and R.W. Waterman (1991): "The Dynamics of Political Control 






























































































EUI Working Papers are published and distributed by the 
European University Institute, Florence
Copies can be obtained free of charge 
-  depending on the availability of stocks -  from:
The Publications Officer 
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana
1-50016 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI) 
Italy



























































































Publications of the European University Institute
To The Publications Officer
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana
1-50016 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI) -  Italy 
Telefax No: +39/55/573728 
E-mail: publish@datacomm.iue.it
From N am e.................................................................
Address.............................................................
□  Please send me a complete list of EUI Working Papers
□  Please send me a complete list of EUI book publications
□  Please send me the EUI brochure Academic Year 1995/96















































































































Educational Expansion and 
Changes in Women's Entry into 
Marriage and Motherhood in the 
Federal Republic of Germany
SPS No. 90/3 
Nico WILTERDINK 
Where Nations Meet: National 
Identities in an International 
Organisation *
SPS No. 90/4 
Hans-Peter BLOSSFELD 
Changes in Educational 
Opportunities in the Federal 
Republic of Germany. A 
Longitudinal Study of Cohorts 
Born Between 1916 and 1965
SPS No. 90/5 
Antonio LA SPINA 
Some Reflections on Cabinets and 
Policy-Making: Types of Policy, 
Features of Cabinets, and Their 
Consequences for Policy Outputs
SPS No. 90/6 
Giandomenico MAJONE 
Cross-National Sources of 
Regulatory Policy-Making 
in Europe and the United States
SPS No. 91/7 
Hans-Peter BLOSSFELD 
Is the German Dual System a 





Karl Ulrich MAYER 
Expansion on the Tertiary Sector 
and Social Inequality.
Is there a New Service Proletariat 








Market Integration and 
Regulation: Europe after 1992 *
SPS No. 91/11
Jean BLONDEL
Ministers of Finance in Western
Europe: A Special Career?
SPS No. 91/12
Jean BLONDEL 
Governments and Supporting 
Parties: Definitions and 
Classifications

































































































The Political Factors Accounting 
for the Relationship Between 




Jerry A. JACOBS 
Consumer, Social and Business 
Services Industries in the United 





Persisting Barriers: Changes in 





DE ROSE/Gotz ROHWER 
Education, Modernization and 
Divorce. Differences in the Effect 
of Women's Educational 
Attainment in Sweden, the Federal 
Republic of Germany 
and Italy




Post-Industrial Class Structures: 
Classifications of Occupations and 
Industries (United States, 
Germany, Sweden and Canada)
SPS No. 92/19
Gotz ROHWER
RZoo: Efficient Storage and
Retrieval of Social Science Data
SPS No. 92/20 
Stefano GUZZINI 
The Continuing Story of a Death 





Ideas, Interests and Policy Change
SPS No. 92/22 
Arpctd SZAKOLCZAI 
On the Exercise of Power in 
Modem Societies, East and West
SPS No. 92/23 
Stefan ROSSBACH 
The Autopoiesis of the Cold War: 
An Evolutionary Approach to 
International Relations?
SPS No. 92/24 
Steven LUKES
On Trade-Offs Between Values
SPS No. 92/25 
Stephan RUSS-MOHL 
Regulating Self-Regulation: The 
Neglected Case of Journalism 
Policies. Securing Quality in 
Journalism and Building Media 






























































































Véronique MUNOZ DARDÉ 
The Idea of Feminism from a 
Kantian Perspective. An Exercise 
in Practical Reasoning
SPS No. 92/27 
Giandomenico MAJONE 
The European Community 




Social Dumping or Innovative
Regulation?
Processes and Outcomes of European 
Decision-Making in the Sector of 
Health and Safety at Work 
Harmonization
*  *  *
SPS No. 93/1
Giandomenico MAJONE 
Mutual Recognition in 
Federal Type Systems *
SPS No. 93/2 
Giandomenico MAJONE 
Deregulation or Re-Regulation? 
Policymaking in the European 
Community Since the Single Act
SPS No. 93/3 
Giandomenico MAJONE 
Controlling Regulatory 
Bureaucracies: Lessons from the 
American Experience
SPS No. 93/4 
Arpàd SZAKOLCZAI 
From Govemmentality to the 
Genealogy of Subjectivity:
On Foucault’s Path in the 1980’s
SPS No. 93/5 
Arpâd SZAKOLCZAI 
Types of Mayors, Types of 
Subjectivity: Continuities and 
Discontinuities in the East-Central 
European Transitions I
SPS No. 93/6 
Louis CHARPENTIER 
Le dilemme de Faction positive 
Analyse du concept à travers les débats 
parlementaires relatifs à la loi sur l’éga­
lité professionnelle entre les femmes et 
les hommes
SPS No. 93/7 
Arpâd SZAKOLCZAI 
Nietzsche’s Genealogical Method: 
Presentation and Application
SPS No. 93/8 
Arpâd SZAKOLCZAI 
Re-Building the Polity: A Com­
parative Study of Mayors in the 
Hungarian, Czech and Slovakian 
Republics
SPS No. 93/9 
Giandomenico MAJONE 
The European Community:
An “Independent Fourth Branch of 
Government”?
SPS No. 93/10 
Stefan ROSSBACH 
The Author’s Care of Himself 
On Friedrich Nietzsche, Michel 
Foucault, and Niklas Luhmann
SPS No. 93/11
Anna TRIANDAFYLLIDOU 
From Qualitative to Quantitative 
Analysis in Political Discourse:
A Computer-Assisted Application



























































































SPS No. 93/12 
Giandomenico MAJONE 
When Does Policy Deliberation 
Matter?
SPS No. 94/1
Richard ARUM/Yossi SHAVIT 
Another Look at Tracking, 




Thinking Beyond the East-West 
Divide: Patocka, Foucault, 
Hamvas, Elias, and the Care of the 
Self
SPS No. 94/3 
Giandomenico MAJONE 
Independence vs. Accountability? 
Non-Majoritarian Institutions and 
Democratic Government in 
Europe
SPS No. 94/4 
Martin J. BULL 
The European Community and 





Value Changes in Hungary, 1978- 
1993: Continuity and 
Discontinuity in the East-Central 
European Transitions II
SPS No. 94/6 
Anna LEANDER 




Robert Gilpin. The Realist Quest
for the Dynamics of Power
SPS No. 94/8 
Roumen DASKALOV 
Images of Europe: A Glance from 
the Periphery
SPS No. 94/9 
Anna LEANDER 
“Robin Hood” Politics? Turkey 
Probing a New Model in the 1990s
SPS No. 94/10
Alan CAFRUNY 
Class, State, and Global Structure: 




Building up a National Identity: 
The Case of Bulgaria
SPS No. 94/12
Stefano GUZZINI 
The Implosion of Clientelistic 
Italy in the 1990s: A Study of 
“Peaceful Change” in 
Comparative Political Economy
SPS No. 94/13 
Johan Jeroen DE DEKEN 
Social Policy in Postwar 
Czechoslovakia.
The Development of Old-Age 
Pensions and Housing Policies 



























































































SPS No. 94/14 
Paolo DONATI
Media Strength and Infrastructural 
Weakness: Recent Trends in the 
Italian Environmentalist 
Movement
SPS No. 94/15 
Frank R. PFETSCH 
Die AuBenpolitik der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland. 




Another Revolution Manquel The 




Understanding Regulatory Growth 
in the European Community
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
